Nos as expression of the ‘ego' in Cicero's Letters to Atticus (books I-IV)

The aim of the paper is to draw attention to the occurrences of nos which refer to the utterer, in alternation with ego, in the first four books of Cicero’s Letters to Atticus. It is argued that the occurrence of the two forms ego and nos referring to the utterer cannot be described as an alternation between variables (either free or complementary) but that a distinctive feature accounts for their opposition. In particular, it is argued that nos ‘ego’ is not a direct, immediate expression of the uttering I, which hic et nunc relates to the coordinates of the utterance (énonciation), but its expanded projection onto the discourse (énoncé). This projected ‘ego’, which is never in direct opposition to the second person, has therefore a feature in common with non-person: this, I would suggest, could be the functional basis for the interpretations reported, all rooted in a general feeling of detachment.